Cómo citar
Benavides Delgado , J., & Roncancio Moreno , M. (2011). Tres debates fundamentales en el campo de la teoría de la mente : aspectos teóricos y metodológicos. Acta Colombiana de Psicología, 14(1), 109-118. Recuperado a partir de https://actacolombianapsicologia.ucatolica.edu.co/article/view/361

Resumen

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar tres de los debates más representativos en el campo del desarrollo de la Teoría de la Mente (TdM) en los niños. Para este efecto se discutirán los siguientes temas: 1) el término TdM (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Reddy, 2008; Wellman 1990/1995); 2) los mecanismos cognoscitivos involucrados en la comprensión de la TdM (Perner, 1991/1994; Leslie, 1987, 1994; Reddy, 2008); y 3) las tareas utilizadas para medir la TdM (Chandler, Fritz & Hala, 1989; Reddy, 2008; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Las conclusiones apuntan a un cuestionamiento del término, a una mirada más amplia de las teorías que sustentan los mecanismos cognoscitivos y a una postura crítica de las estrategias metodológicas utilizadas en estos estudios.

Licencia

Derechos de autor 2011 Jacqueline Benavides Delgado, Mónica Roncancio Moreno

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Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.

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