PDF (Español (España))
FLIP
Authors who publish in this journal agree to the following terms:
Acta Colombiana de Psicología complies with international intellectual property and copyright laws, and particularly with Article No. 58 of the Political Constitution of Colombia, Law No. 23 of 1982, and the Agreement No. 172 of September 30, 2010 (Universidad Católica de Colombia Intellectual Property Regulation).
Authors retain their copyright and grant to the Acta Colombiana de Psicología the right of first publication, with the work registered under Creative Commons attribution license, which allows third parties to use the published material, provided they credit the authorship of the work and the first publication in this Journal.
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that a substantial difference exists between the derealization and depersonalization disorders. The fundamental arguments point out that each one of these disorders has a specific symptomatic presentation, that the descriptions made by patients about their experiences have different contents and forms, and that a particular theoretical proposal can be elaborated to explain the manner in which each one of these disorders it is articulated. In order to achieve that objective, a logical and conceptual analysis of a clinical derealización and depersonalization case is developed. A dyadic theory about each one of these disorders is offered. For the derealization a model whereby the relationships between the World and the Self are the core of the discussion is proposed. And for depersonalization, a model whereby the Body and the Self have the priority is presented. The paper arrives at the conclusion that derealization and depersonalization can be considered and conceptualized as different entities, although they can be presented in relational or causal way.
Keywords:
References
Ackner, B. (1954). Depersonalization I. Aetiology and Phenomenology: II. Clinical Syndromes. J MentSci, 100, 838-72.
American Psychiatric Association (2004) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-IV-TR (Text Revision). American Psychiatric Association.
Byrne, A. (2004). Perception and Conceptual Content. En: Sosa E & Steup M (Eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell.
De La Mata, M. (1997). Memoria y conciencia: una aproximación sociocultural. Estudios de Psicología, 18(2), 85-104.
Guimón J. (1999). Los lugares del cuerpo. Neurobiología y psicosociología de la corporalidad. Barcelona: Paidós.
Guralnik O, Giesbrecht T, Knutelska M, Sirroff B, y Simeon D. (2007). Cognitive Functioning in Depersonalization Disorder, J Nerv Ment Dis, 195, 983–988.
Guralnik, O., Schmeidler, J., Simeon, D. (2000). Feeling unreal: cognitive processes in depersonalization. Am J Psychiatry, 157, 103–109.
Herrera, D. (1999). El yo en la fenomenología de Husserl. Estudios de Filosofía, 19-20, 11-23.
Kant, I. (2007). Crítica de la razón pura. Editorial Colihue: Buenos Aires.
Luque, R., Villagrán, J. & Berrios, G. E. (2003). Teoría del síntoma mental. En: Ayuso Gutiérrez JL, (dir.). Hacia una nueva psicopatología descriptiva. Monografías de psiquiatría, 15(1), 38-40.
Martin, C. (2006). Simulacros: El tiempo de una danza evanescente. Lindajara, 4. Medford, N., Brierley, B., Brammer, M., Bullmore, E., David, A. & Phillips, M. (2006). Emotional memory in depersonalization disorder: A functional MRI study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 148, 93–102.
Montagne, B., Sierra, M., Medford, N., Hunter, E., Baker, D., Kessels, R., de Haan, E. & David, A. (2007). Emotional memory and perception of emotional faces in patients suffering from depersonalization disorder. British Journal of Psychology, 98, 517–527.
Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and content: experience, thought, and their relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Quesada, D. (2003). Fenomenología y contenido intencional en la percepción. En: Paredes, M (Ed.). Intencionalidad, mundo y sentido: problemas de fenomenología y metafísica. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca. pp.103-114.
Sierra, M. (2008). La despersonalización: aspectos clínicos y neurobiológicos. Rev Colomb Psiquiat, 37(1), 40-55.
Sierra, M. & Berrios, G. E. (1997). Depersonalization: A conceptual history. Hist Psychiatry, 8, 213–229.
Sierra, M. & Berrios, G. E. (2001). The phenomenological stability of depersonalization: Comparing the old with the new. J Nerv Ment Dis, 189, 629–636.
Sierra, M., Gomez, J., Molina, J., Luque, R., Muñoz., J. & David, A. (2006). Depersonalization in Psychiatric Patients: A Transcultural Study. J Nerv Ment Dis, 194(5), 356 - 361.
Sierra, M., Lopera, F., Lambert, M., Phillips, M. & David, A. (2002). Separating depersonalization and derealisation: the relevance of the lesion method. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry, 72 (4), 530-2.
Sierra, M. & David, A. (2007). Depersonalization and ‘Individualism’: The Effect of Culture on Symptom Profi les in Panic Disorder. J Nerv Ment Dis, 195 (12), 989-995.
Stigol, N. (2000). Representacionalismo y qualia. Teorema, 19, 31-39.
Vella, G. (1965). Depersonnalisation somatopsyche et troubles du schema corporel. L’evolution Psychiatrique, 30, 147-50.
